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To guarantee the security of uniform random numbers generated by a quantum random number
generator, we study secure extraction of uniform random numbers when the environment of a given
quantum state is controlled by the third party, the eavesdropper. Here we restrict our operations
to incoherent strategies that are composed of the measurement on the computational basis and
incoherent operations (or incoherence-preserving operations). We show that the maximum secure
extraction rate is equal to the relative entropy of coherence. By contrast, the coherence of formation
gives the extraction rate when a certain constraint is imposed on eavesdropper’s operations. The
condition under which the two extraction rates coincide is then determined. Furthermore, we find
that the exponential decreasing rate of the leaked information is characterized by Rényi relative
entropies of coherence. These results clarify the power of incoherent strategies in random number
generation, and can be applied to guarantee the quality of random numbers generated by a quantum
random number generator.
Recently, quantum random number generation at-
tracts much attention because of many practical appli-
cations, such as cryptography, scientific simulation, and
foundational studies [1, 2]. A quantum random num-
ber generator is a device for extracting secure uniform
random numbers from quantum states. Its experimental
demonstration has been done with quantum optics [3–6].
Ideally, the random numbers generated should be inde-
pendent of the third party, the eavesdropper (Eve). In
practice, however, the relevant states or random numbers
are often correlated to Eve. For this reason, it is crucial
to extract secure uniform random numbers from random
numbers whose side information is leaked to Eve. This
task is called secure uniform random number extraction,
which has been studied in the framework of information
security, and has been considered as a basic tool for quan-
tum key distribution [7–9]. Here the goal of the legiti-
mate user, Alice, is to generate random numbers that
are almost independent of Eve. Usually, the initial state
is taken to be a classical-quantum (C-Q) state ρAE , in
which, Alice’s information is given as a classical random
number, while Eve’s information is given as a quantum
state that is correlated to Alice’s random variable. When
the n-tensor product state ρ⊗nAE is given, it is known that
the asymptotic secure extraction rate is equal to the con-
ditional entropy H(A|E)ρAE := S(ρAE)− S(ρE).
To guarantee the quality of the random numbers gener-
ated in a quantum random number generator, it is usually
assumed that the environment of Alice’s system is con-
trolled by Eve. This convention covers the most powerful
Eve and is typical in similar research areas. For example,
in the study of quantum key distribution [8, 10, 11] and
private capacity [12], all of the environment is assumed to
be under Eve’s control. Further, since Alice generates the
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quantum state on her system, which is under her control,
it is natural to treat Alice’s initial information as a quan-
tum state in the same way as Eve’s state. In fact, there
are several formulations of secure uniform random num-
ber extraction with quantum-quantum states [13, Section
4.3][14–16]. However, little is known about the optimal
extraction rate. This is because it is not easy to clarify
the reasonable range of allowed operations.
To extract random numbers from a quantum state, Al-
ice can apply a projective measurement. However, not
all quantum states can produce secure random numbers
in this way given that the environment is controlled by
Eve. Quantum coherence with respect to the measure-
ment basis is crucial to realizing the independence from
the environment and the randomness of the outcome si-
multaneously [1, 2]. In addition, in many practical sce-
narios, it is not easy to create or increase coherence in
quantum systems [17, 18]. Understanding the limit of
random number generation in such practical scenarios is
thus of paramount interest not only to theoretical study,
but also to real applications. Although coherence is in-
2dispensable in many applications, such as laser and quan-
tum metrology, the resource theory of coherence was not
established until recently [18–23]. Under this framework,
Yuan et al. [24, 25] showed that the amount of random-
ness upon measurement on the computational basis is
closely related to several important coherence measures,
such as the relative entropy of coherence and coherence
of formation. The relation between our paper and [24]
is explained in more detail in Appendix I. However, the
extraction of uniform random numbers under general in-
coherent operations has not been discussed.
Motivated by the problem mentioned above, in this
paper we study the secure extraction of uniform ran-
dom numbers under incoherent strategies, which include
the measurement on the computational basis and gen-
eral incoherent operations (or incoherence-preserving op-
erations) [18–21]. To guarantee the security of the ran-
dom numbers generated, we assume that the environment
of the relevant quantum state is controlled by Eve; see
Fig. 1. We show that the maximum secure extraction
rate is equal to the relative entropy of coherence. By
contrast, the extraction rate coincides with the coherence
of formation if Eve’s operations are constrained in a spe-
cial way. The condition under which the extraction rates
in the two scenarios coincide has a simple description.
Furthermore, we show that the exponential decreasing
rate of the leaked information is characterized by Rényi
relative entropies of coherence. These results not only
clarify the power of incoherent strategies in extracting
random numbers, but also endow operational meanings
to a number of important coherence measures.
The resource theory of coherence is characterized by
the set of incoherent states, denoted by I, and the set
of incoherent operations [18–21]. Recall that a state is
incoherent if it is diagonal with respect to the reference
computational basis. A quantum operation, represented
by a completely positive trace preserving (CPTP) map,
is incoherence-preserving (also called maximally incoher-
ent) if it maps incoherent states to incoherent states [19].
It is incoherent if, in addition, each Kraus operator in its
Kraus representation maps incoherent states to incoher-
ent states up to normalization [20]. An incoherent oper-
ation is physically incoherent if it admits an incoherent
Stinespring dilation [22]. For unitary transformations,
the three types of operations coincide. A unitary oper-
ator is incoherent if and only if (iff) each row and each
column has only one nonzero entry.
The relative entropy of coherence Cr(ρ) of a quantum
state ρ is the minimum relative entropy between the state
and any incoherent state [19, 20],
Cr(ρ) := min
σ∈I
S(ρ‖σ) = S(ρdiag)− S(ρ), (1)
where S(ρ‖σ) := tr ρ(log ρ− log σ) is the relative entropy
between ρ and σ, S(ρ) is the von Neumann entropy of ρ,
and ρdiag is the diagonal part of ρ. In this paper “log” has
base 2. The coherence of formation CF(ρ) is the convex
roof of Cr(ρ) [19, 24],
CF(ρ) := min{pj ,|ψj〉}
∑
j
pjCr(|ψj〉〈|ψj |), (2)
where {pj, |ψj〉} satisfies ρ =
∑
j pj |ψj〉〈ψj |. It is known
that the relative entropy of coherence Cr(ρ) is equal to
the distillable coherence, and the coherence of formation
CF(ρ) is equal to the coherence cost [21].
In practice, Alice repeatedly generates many copies of
identical and independent quantum states. This assump-
tion allows us to write the state of the whole system as
a tensor product, so our problem can be formulated as
follows. Suppose Alice holds n copies of the quantum
state ρ˜A on system HA whose environment is controlled
by Eve. All the information of Eve about Alice’s systems
is encoded in a purification, say ρ˜⊗n, of ρ˜⊗nA . Alice is al-
lowed to perform only incoherent strategies, which can be
divided into three steps without loss of generality. First,
she applies an incoherent unitary operation Ui,n on the
system and an ancilla system HB , whose initial state is
|0〉. Second, she performs the measurement Mc,n on the
computational basis, whose set of outcomes is denoted by
An. Finally, as post-measurement processing, she applies
a random hash function Fn from An to a suitable set Ln.
The cardinality (number of elements) of Ln is denoted
by |Ln|, which also expresses the dimension of the out-
put system. In this paper, a random variable is denoted
by an italic capital letter, and its probability space by
the same letter in mathcal font. The incoherent strategy
of Alice is characterized by the triple (Ui,n,Mc,n, Fn) and
is denoted by MFn for simplicity. The cardinality |Ln| is
also denoted by |MFn |.
To determine the maximum extraction rate of secure
uniform random numbers, we need a security measure.
When the whole system is characterized by a C-Q state
ρAE , a widely accepted measure on secure random num-
bers is the trace norm (also known as the Schatten 1-
norm) between the real state and the ideal state,
d1(ρAE) := ‖ρAE − τ|A| ⊗ ρE‖1, (3)
where τV is the completely mixed state on the V -
dimensional system. So, τ|A| expresses the completely
mixed state on HA. The significance of this measure lies
in the fact that it is universally composable [7, 9].
Here the security measure of concern is the value
d1(MFn |Fn) := EFnd1(MFn(ρ˜⊗n)), where EFn expresses
the expectation with respect to the choice of the ran-
dom hash function. The maximum asymptotic extrac-
tion rate of secure uniform random numbers R(ρ˜A) from
the n-tensor product ρ˜⊗nA is defined as
R(ρ˜A) := max{MFn}
{
lim inf
n→∞
log |MFn |
n
∣∣∣d1(MFn |Fn)→ 0
}
,
(4)
where the maximum is taken over sequences of incoherent
strategies MFn which satisfy the given condition.
3To compute the rate R(ρ˜A), we need to study the un-
certainty of Alice’s system from Eve’s viewpoint when the
initial state onHA⊗HE is a pure state. This uncertainty
can be measured by the conditional entropy H(A|E)ρ˜ =
S(ρ˜)− S(ρ˜E). To maximize Eve’s uncertainty, Alice can
introduce an ancilla system HB prepared in the incoher-
ent state |0〉〈0|, so that the initial state is ρ˜⊗|0〉〈0|. Then
she applies an incoherent unitary Ui on HA⊗HB , which
leads to the output state ρ˜[Ui] := Ui(ρ˜⊗|0〉〈0|)U †i . When
dB := dim(HB) ≥ dA := dim(HA), a particularly inter-
esting incoherent unitary is the the generalized CNOT
gate defined as
UCNOT :=
∑
x; y<dA
|x, x+y〉〈x, y|+
∑
x; y≥dA
|x, y〉〈x, y|, (5)
where the addition x+ y is modulo dA.
Theorem 1.
1
n
max
Ui
H(A|E)ρ˜⊗n[Ui] =max
Ui
H(A|E)ρ˜[Ui]
=H(A|E)ρ˜[UCNOT] = Cr(ρ˜A), (6)
where Ui is an incoherent unitary.
Proof. Let Ui be any incoherent unitary. Then
H(A|E)ρ˜[Ui] = −H(A|B)ρ˜[Ui] ≤ Er(ρ˜[Ui]AB)
≤ Cr(ρ˜[Ui]AB) ≤ Cr(ρ˜A). (7)
Here the equality follows from the duality relation
H(A|E)ρ+H(A|B)ρ = 0, which holds whenever ρ is pure;
the first inequality follows from [26][27, Lemma 4], the
second inequality from the fact that incoherent states for
a bipartite system are separable, and the third inequal-
ity from the fact that the relative entropy of coherence is
monotonic under incoherence-preserving operations.
According to the duality relation and [28][27, Theo-
rem 1], H(A|E)ρ˜[UCNOT] = −H(A|B)ρ˜[UCNOT] = Cr(ρ˜A),
note that ρ˜[UCNOT]AB is a maximally correlated state
[29–31]. Therefore, maxUi H(A|E)ρ˜[Ui] = Cr(ρ˜A). Now
the proof of (6) is completed by the additivity relation
Cr(ρ˜
⊗n
A ) = nCr(ρ˜A) [21, 27].
Theorem 1 is helpful for computing the extraction rate
R(ρ˜A) as follows. If Alice performs the measurement Mc
in the computational basis, then ρ˜ is turned into the state
Mc(ρ˜) :=
∑
x |x〉〈x| ⊗ 〈x|ρ˜|x〉, which satisfies
H(A|E)Mc(ρ˜) = H(A|E)ρ˜[UCNOT] = Cr(ρ˜A). (8)
After repeating this procedure and generating the state
Mc(ρ˜)
⊗n, Alice applies a random hash function Fn to the
n measurement outcomes with the extraction rate of uni-
form random numbers chosen to be R. Here the random
hash function Fn is assumed to satisfy the universal 2
condition as discussed in Appendix A [32, 33], which is
conventional in generating secure random numbers from
random numbers that might be partially leaked to the
E
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FIG. 2. Extended strategy. Alice can apply a general incoher-
ent (or incoherence-preserving) operation Λi. Both HE and
HE′ are in Eve’s hands.
eavesdropper. The efficient construction of such hash
functions was discussed in [34]. In the independent and
identical situation, Proposition 3 in Appendix A shows
that the extracted random numbers are secure when the
extraction rate R is smaller than the conditional entropy
H(A|E)Mc(ρ˜). Therefore, we have R(ρ˜A) ≥ H(A|E)Mc(ρ˜).
Since Alice can optimize the incoherent unitary before
the measurement Mc, it follows that
R(ρ˜A) ≥ max
Ui
H(A|E)ρ˜[Ui]. (9)
Conversely, as shown in Appendix B, the opposite in-
equality
R(ρ˜A) ≤ lim inf
n→∞
1
n
max
Ui
H(A|E)ρ˜⊗n[Ui] (10)
holds. Combining (6) of Theorem 1 with (9) and (10),
we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 2. The extraction rate R(ρ˜A) is given by
R(ρ˜A) = max
Ui
H(A|E)ρ˜[Ui] = Cr(ρ˜A), (11)
where Ui is an incoherent unitary.
According to (8), (9), and (10), the maximum extrac-
tion rate Cr(ρ˜A) stated in Theorem 2 can be achieved by
the measurementMc on the computational basis (without
other incoherent operations) followed by classical data
processing characterized by Fn. This strategy is denoted
by M∗Fn henceforth.
Now, we extend Alice’s incoherent unitaries to general
incoherence-preserving CPTP maps acting on the system
HA ⊗HB. If she uses a CPTP map whose final state is
always the specific incoherent state
∑d−1
i=0
1
d |i〉〈i|, the re-
sulting conditional entropy equals log d, which increases
unlimitedly as d increases. To avoid such a trivial advan-
tage for Alice, similar to the study of quantum key dis-
tribution [8, 10, 11] and private capacity [12], we assume
that the environment HE′ of the incoherence-preserving
CPTP map Λi is also controlled by Eve, so that Eve
4has the two systems HE and HE′ in total. This is be-
cause it is not easy to exclude the possibility that Eve
accesses a system that interacts with Alice’s operation.
To cover such a worst scenario, we take this convention
and consider the Stinespring representation ρE′ [Λi], U [Λi]
of Λi, where ρE′ [Λi] is the initial pure state on the en-
vironment and U [Λi] is the unitary on the whole sys-
tem. Note that U [Λi] may not be incoherent if Λi is not
physically incoherent [22], but this fact does not affect
the following argument. Now the total output state is
ρ˜[Λi] := U [Λi](ρ˜ ⊗ |0〉〈0| ⊗ ρE′ [Λi])U [Λi]†. Since ρ˜[Λi]
is a pure state, we can still use the duality relation on
conditional entropies. So, similar to (7), we have
H(A|E)ρ˜[Λi] ≤ Er(ρ˜[Λi]AB) ≤ Cr(ρ˜A). (12)
Again, the two inequalities are saturated when Λi is the
generalized CNOT gate. Therefore, Theorems 1 and 2
still hold if incoherent unitaries are replaced by general
incoherence-preserving operations.
Here, we need to discuss the relation with the dis-
tillable coherence CD(ρ˜A) under incoherent operations,
which is equal to Cr(ρ˜A) [21]. Note that coherence dis-
tillation may require incoherent operations across many
copies, and these operations may not be physically inco-
herent. By contrast, to implement our optimal protocol,
it suffices to perform the measurement Mc followed by
classical data processing, i.e., application of universal 2
hash functions, which is much easier.
Now, we remember that the criterion d1 universally
covers the distinguishability by Eve’s local measurement
ME . Since the criterion d1 is universally composable, the
above discussion covers the case in which Eve chooses
her local measurement ME according to the choice of the
hash function fn. Now, we consider the scenario in which
Eve cannot choose her local measurement ME according
to the random choice of the hash function Fn, although
she knows which hash function Fn is applied after her
measurement ME . Here fn denotes a specific hash func-
tion, while Fn denotes a random hash function. Given
the n tensor product state ρ˜⊗n, we introduce a new se-
curity criterion d1(MFn |Fn) as
d1(MFn |Fn) := max
ME
EFnd1
(
MFn(ME(ρ˜)
⊗n)
)
=max
ME
EFnd1
(
MFn(M
⊗n
E (ρ˜
⊗n))
) ≤ d1(MFn |Fn), (13)
where ME is Eve’s POVM on the system HE . Then,
instead of R(ρ˜A), we define
R(ρ˜A) := max{MFn}
{
lim inf
n→∞
log |MFn |
n
∣∣∣∣ d1(MFn |Fn)→ 0
}
,
(14)
where the maximum is taken over sequences of incoher-
ent strategiesMFn which satisfy the given condition. The
relation (13) implies the inequality R(ρ˜A) ≥ R(ρ˜A). In-
stead of Theorem 2, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 3.
R(ρ˜A) = CF(ρ˜A). (15)
This theorem offers an operational meaning of the
coherence of formation CF(ρ˜A). Since the relation
CF(ρ˜A) ≥ Cr(ρ˜A) holds in general and the inequality
is generically strict, Theorems 2 and 3 show that Alice
can usually extract secure uniform random numbers with
a higher rate if Eve chooses her measurement indepen-
dently of the incoherent strategies of Alice. In conjunc-
tion with Theorem 10 in [21], we can deduce the condition
under which the rates in the two scenarios coincide.
Theorem 4. The inequality R(ρ˜A) ≥ R(ρ˜A) is satu-
rated iff ρ˜A is pure or its eigenvectors are supported on or-
thogonal subspaces spanned by a partition of basis states
in the reference basis.
The following corollary is an easy consequence of The-
orem 4; a direct proof is presented in the appendix.
Corollary 1. A qubit state ρ˜A saturates the inequality
R(ρ˜A) ≥ R(ρ˜A) iff ρ˜A is pure or incoherent.
In many topics of quantum information, the Rényi en-
tropies characterize the exponential decreasing rate of
the error probability, which determines the speed of con-
vergence [35, 36]. Concerning secure uniform random
number generation, it is known that the exponential de-
creasing rate of the leaked information is characterized by
Rényi conditional entropies, as explained in Appendix A.
To determine the speed of convergence d1(MFn |Fn)→ 0,
we introduce the Rényi relative entropy of coherence
Cr,α(ρ) := minσ∈I Sα(ρ‖σ) [27, 37] based on the Rényi
relative entropy Sα(ρ‖σ) := 1α−1 log tr
(
σ
1−α
2α ρσ
1−α
2α
)α
with α ≥ 0 [38, 39][40][41, Theorem 5.13]. Combining
Proposition 2 in Appendix A with a generalization of
Theorem 1 in Appendix D, we can derive the following
theorem, whose proof is relegated to Appendix E.
Theorem 5. Suppose that Fn are universal 2 hash and
have extraction rate R. Then
lim inf
n→∞
−1
n
log d1(M
∗
Fn |Fn) ≥ maxs∈[0,1]
s
2
(
Cr, 1+s1+2s
(ρ˜A)−R
)
.
(16)
Theorem 5 shows that the exponential decreasing rate
of the leaked information of the strategy M∗Fn is charac-
terized by Rényi relative entropies of coherence. In other
words, the quality of the random numbers extracted in
this way is controlled by these coherence measures. In in-
formation theory, another useful security measure is the
relative entropy between the true state and the ideal state
[42], which is known to be the unique measure under sev-
eral natural assumptions [43, Theorem 8]. In Appendix F
we show that an analog of Theorem 5 holds for this al-
ternative measure.
Conclusion: We studied the extraction of secure uni-
form random numbers in the quantum-quantum setting
5under incoherent strategies, assuming that Eve can access
all of the environment of the given system. This prob-
lem properly reflects the situation of a quantum random
number generator. We showed that the maximum rate
of extraction is equal to the relative entropy of coher-
ence. In contrast, the extraction rate with a constrained
eavesdropper is equal to the coherence of formation. Fur-
thermore, the exponential decreasing rate of the leaked
information is characterized by Rényi relative entropies
of coherence. These results not only clarify the capability
of incoherent strategies in extracting secure uniform ran-
dom numbers, but also endow coherence measures men-
tioned above with operational meanings.
To apply our results to the security evaluation of a
quantum random number generator, we need to estimate
the quantum state ρ˜A on Alice’s system priorly. For-
tunately, as explained in Appendix H, this task can be
achieved by quantum state tomography, which has been
well established [44–46][41, Chapter 6]. Even when Al-
ice’s quantum system cannot be trusted, we can estimate
the quantum state ρ˜A of Alice’s system by combining the
method of self testing [47–49]. Therefore, our study is
helpful to the design of a quantum random number gen-
erator; see Appendix H for more details.
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Appendix A: Secure uniform random number
extraction from a C-Q state
Here, we summarize known results on secure uniform
random number extraction when the state is a C-Q state
on the composite system HA ⊗HE , which has the form
ρAE =
∑
a
PA(a)|a〉〈a| ⊗ ρE|a. (A1)
Given a function f , we define the state
ρf(A)E :=
∑
a
PA(a)|f(a)〉〈f(a)| ⊗ ρE|a. (A2)
To study secure uniform random number extraction from
a C-Q state, we need to consider the uncertainty quanti-
fied by three types of Rényi conditional entropies,
H
↑
α(A|E)ρ := −minσE Sα(ρAE‖IA ⊗ σE), (A3)
H
↓
α(A|E)ρ := −Sα(ρAE‖IA ⊗ ρE), (A4)
H↑α(A|E)ρ := −min
σE
Sα(ρAE‖IA ⊗ σE). (A5)
Here the two types of Rényi relative entropies are defined
as [38, 39] [41, Section 3.1]
Sα(ρ‖σ) := 1
α− 1 log tr(ρ
ασ1−α), (A6)
Sα(ρ‖σ) :=
1
α− 1 log tr
(
σ
1−α
2α ρσ
1−α
2α
)α
, (A7)
which satisfy the inequality Sα(ρ‖σ) ≥ Sα(ρ‖σ). Both
Sα(ρ‖σ) and Sα(ρ‖σ) increase monotonically with α.
To extract secure uniform random numbers, we can
employ a universal 2 hash function. A random function
F from A to Z is called universal 2 hash if
P{F (a) = F (a′)} ≤ 1|Z| (A8)
for a 6= a′ ∈ A. This type of hash functions satisfy the
following leftover hashing lemma.
Proposition 1 ([7]). Let F be a universal 2 hash func-
tion from A to Z. Then, we have
EFd1(ρF (A)E) ≤ |Z|
1
2 2−
1
2H
↑
2(A|E)ρAE . (A9)
To characterize the ultimate amount of extracted se-
cure uniform random numbers, we define the rate
K(ρAE) :=
sup
Fn
{
lim inf
n→∞
log |Fn|
n
∣∣∣EFnd1((ρ⊗n)Fn(A)E)→ 0
}
,
(A10)
where |Fn| denotes the cardinality of the image of Fn
and the supremum is taken over sequences of random
hash functions which satisfy the given condition. The
quantityK(ρAE) expresses the maximum extraction rate
of secure uniform random numbers.
In this setting, the simple application of Proposition 1
cannot guarantee the exponential decrease of the leaked
information even when the extraction rate R of uniform
random numbers is smaller than the conditional entropy
H(A|E)ρAE . To resolve this problem, we employ another
proposition based on the discussions in [50], which in turn
rely on Proposition 1.
Proposition 2. If a sequence of hash functions Fn from
An to {1, . . . , 2nR} is universal 2 hash, then
lim inf
n→∞
− 1
n
logEFnd1
(
(ρ⊗n)Fn(A)E
)
≥ max
s∈[0,1]
1
2
(
sH
↑
1+s(A|E)ρAE − sR
)
. (A11)
6Proof. First, we introduce the quantity [50, Section IV]
∆d,2(M |ρAE)
:= min
σE
min
ρ′AE
[
2‖ρAE − ρ′AE‖1 +M
1
2 2
1
2S2(ρ
′
AE‖IA⊗σE)
]
,
where minρ′AE denotes the minimum under the condi-
tion tr ρ′AE ≤ 1 and ρ′AE ≥ 0, while minσE denotes the
minimum over normalized states σE . Here, the quan-
tity S2(ρ
′‖σ) is defined in the same way as in (A7), that
is, S2(ρ
′‖σ) = 1α−1 log tr
(
σ
1−α
2α ρ′σ
1−α
2α
)α
, even when ρ′ is
not normalized. Then, as shown in [50, (73)], Proposi-
tion 1 implies that
EFnd1
(
(ρ⊗n)Fn(A)E
) ≤ ∆d,2(2nR|ρ⊗nAE). (A12)
Let vn be the number of distinct eigenvalues of σ
⊗n
E .
Then the inequality [50, the next inequality of (83)] yields
that
∆d,2(2
nR|ρ⊗nAE)
≤ (4 +√vn)2
s
2nR+
s
2S1+s
(
E
σ
⊗n
E
(ρ⊗nAE)‖I⊗σ⊗nE
)
(A13)
for s ∈ [0, 1], where the CPTP map Eσ is defined as
Eσ(ρ) :=
∑
x
ExρEx, (A14)
assuming that σ has the spectral decomposition σ =∑
x λxEx.
Since vn is a polynomial in n, we have
lim
n→∞
1
n
log vn = 0. (A15)
In addition,
lim
n→∞
1
n
S1+s
(
Eσ⊗nE
(ρ⊗nAE)‖I ⊗ σ⊗nE
)
= S1+s(ρAE‖I ⊗ σE)
(A16)
according to [51][41, (3.17)]. Combining the four equa-
tions (A12), (A13), (A15), and (A16) yields
lim inf
n→∞
−1
n
logEFnd1
(
(ρ⊗n)Fn(A)E
)
≥ max
s∈[0,1]
1
2
(−sS1+s(ρAE‖I ⊗ σE)− sR). (A17)
Taking the maximum of the right hand side (RHS) of
(A17) over σE , we obtain (A11).
When R < H(A|E), according to Proposition 2, the
amount of leaked information EFnd1
(
(ρ⊗n)Fn(A)E
)
goes
to zero. Hence, we have
K(ρAE) ≥ H(A|E)ρAE . (A18)
Since the opposite inequality also holds [7][50, (93)], we
deduce the following proposition.
Proposition 3. [7][50, (94)]
K(ρAE) = H(A|E)ρAE . (A19)
In the current context, we often consider another se-
curity criterion I ′(ρAE) defined as the relative entropy
between the true state and the ideal state [50, (29)][52,
(9)],
I ′(ρAE) := S(ρAE‖τ|A| ⊗ ρE) = log |A| −H(A|E)ρAE ,
(A20)
where τ|A| denotes the completely mixed state on HA.
Under this security criterion, we have the following ana-
log of Proposition 2.
Proposition 4. [52, (33)] If a sequence of hash functions
Fn from An to {1, . . . , 2nR} is universal 2 hash, then
lim inf
n→∞
− 1
n
logEFnI
′((ρ⊗n)Fn(A)E)
≥ max
s∈[0,1]
(
sH
↓
1+s(A|E)ρAE − sR
)
. (A21)
Appendix B: Proofs of (10) and Theorem 3
Proof of (10): LetMFn = (Ui,n,Mc,n, Fn) be a sequence
of incoherent strategies that satisfy d1(MFn |Fn) → 0,
that is,
EFn
∥∥MFn(ρ˜⊗n)− τ|MFn | ⊗MFn(ρ˜⊗n)E
∥∥
1
→ 0. (B1)
Then
1
n
∣∣H(A|E)MFn (ρ˜⊗n) −H(A|E)τ|MFn |⊗MFn (ρ˜⊗n)E
∣∣→ 0
(B2)
according to Fannes inequality for the conditional en-
tropy [41, Exercise 5.38][53]. Since τ|MFn | is the com-
pletely mixed state on the |MFn |-dimensional system, we
haveH(A|E)τ|MFn |⊗MFn(ρ˜⊗n)E = log |MFn |, which implies
that
lim inf
n→∞
EFn
1
n
H(A|E)MFn (ρ˜⊗n) = lim infn→∞
1
n
log |MFn |.
(B3)
Now (10) is a consequence of the following equation
EFnH(A|E)MFn (ρ˜⊗n) ≤ H(A|E)Mc,n(Ui,n(ρ˜⊗n⊗|0〉〈0|)U†i,n)
= H(A|E)UCNOTUi,n(ρ˜⊗n⊗|0〉〈0|)U†i,nU†CNOT
≤ max
Ui
H(A|E)ρ˜⊗n[Ui]. (B4)

Proof of Theorem 3: If R < minME H(A|E)Mc(ME(ρ˜)),
then Alice can extract uniform random numbers using
7the method described in Appendix A, and Proposition 2
there guarantees that the extracted random numbers are
secure. Therefore,
R(ρ˜A) ≥min
ME
H(A|E)Mc(ME(ρ˜))
(a)
= min
{pj ,|ψj〉}
∑
j
pjCr(|ψj〉〈ψj |) = CF(ρA), (B5)
where (a) follows from the fact that any decomposition
of ρ˜A can be induced by a suitable POVM on HE .
Let MFn = (Ui,n,Mc,n, Fn) be a sequence of incoherent
strategies whose extraction rate is R and which satisfies
d1(MFn |Fn) → 0. Since EFnd1(MFn(ME(ρ˜)⊗n)) → 0 for
any local measurement ME of Eve, using the same argu-
ment that leads to (B4), we can show the inequality
R = lim inf
n→∞
EFn
1
n
H(A|E)MFn (ME(ρ˜)⊗n)
≤max
Ui
H(A|E)Ui(ME(ρ˜)⊗|0〉〈0|)U†i . (B6)
Taking the minimum over ME, we have
R ≤min
ME
max
Ui
H(A|E)Ui(ME(ρ˜)⊗|0〉〈0|)U†i
= min
{pj ,|ψj〉}
∑
j
pjCr(|ψj〉〈ψj |) = CF(ρA), (B7)
which yields the opposite inequality to (B5).

Appendix C: Possibility of extension of Theorem 3
Since the coherence of formation is additive, that is,
CF(ρ
⊗n) = nCF(ρ) [21], one might expect a further ex-
tension of Theorem 3. That is, one might speculate that
the relation R(ρ˜A) = CF(ρ˜A) holds even when the condi-
tion d1(MFn |Fn) → 0 is replaced by the stronger condi-
tion maxME,n EFnd1(MFn(ME,n(ρ˜
⊗n))) → 0. Here, note
thatME,n is a POVM on the n-tensor product system; by
contrast, in the definition of d1(MFn |Fn), Eve’s POVMs
are restricted to tensor powers of POVMs on individual
systems. However, the additivity of CF alone does not
imply this stronger statement.
This stronger statement would follow from a stronger
condition as described as follows. Given α > 0, define
the Rényi coherence of formation as
CF,1/α(ρ) := min{pj ,|ψj〉}
1
1− α log
∑
j
pj2
(1−α)Cr,1/α(|ψj〉〈ψj |),
(C1)
where {pj , |ψj〉} satisfies ρ =
∑
j pj|ψj〉〈ψj |. As shown
later,
lim
α→1
CF,α(ρ) = CF(ρ). (C2)
In addition, if the classical Rényi conditional entropy sat-
isfied the chain rule, i.e.,
H↓α(A1A2|E)ρ = H↓α(A1|E)ρ +H↓α(A2|A1E)ρ, (C3)
then the Rényi coherence of formation would be additive,
CF,1/α(ρ1 ⊗ ρ2) = CF,1/α(ρ1) + CF,1/α(ρ2) (C4)
for any pair of density matrices ρ1 and ρ2 on A1 and
A2. Assuming this additivity relation, we can show the
inequality
max
ME,n
EFnd1
(
M
∗
Fn(ME,n(ρ˜
⊗n))
) ≤ 3 · 2sn(R−CF,1−s(ρ˜A))
(C5)
for s ∈ [0, 1/2], where M∗Fn denotes the optimal incoher-
ent strategy composed of the computational-basis mea-
surement and the application of the universal 2 hash
function Fn. In this way, the combination of (C2) and
(C5) implies that maxME,n EFnd1(M
∗
Fn
(ME,n(ρ˜
⊗n)))→ 0
if R < CF(ρ˜A).
However, it is known that the Rényi conditional en-
tropy does not satisfy the chain rule satisfied by the usual
conditional entropy even in the classical case [54, 55].
This quantity satisfies only a weaker version of the chain
rule [54, Theorem 1][56, Corollary 87] [55, Theorem 3].
Hence, it is not easy to show the relation R(ρ˜A) =
CF(ρ˜A) with the above replacement.
Proof of (C2): For a given {pj, |ψj〉}, the value∑
j pj2
(1−α)Cr,1/α(|ψj〉〈|ψj |) equals 1 when α = 1. So,
the formula of the logarithmic derivative ddx log f(x) =
1
ln 2
df
dx(x)/f(x) yields that
lim
α→1
1
1− α log
∑
j
pj2
(1−α)Cr,1/α(|ψj〉〈|ψj |)
=
1
ln 2
lim
s→0
∑
j pj2
sCr,1/(1−s)(|ψj〉〈|ψj|) − 1
s
=
∑
j
pj lim
s→0
sCr,1/(1−s)(|ψj〉〈|ψj |)
s
=
∑
j
pjCr(|ψj〉〈|ψj |),
which implies (C2).

Derivation of (C4) assuming the chain rule (C3): When
ρ is pure, according to [27, 37], we have
CF,1/α(ρ) = Cr,1/α(ρ) = Sα(ρ
diag) = Sα(Mc(ρ)), (C6)
where
Sα(ρ) =
1
1− α log tr(ρ
α) (C7)
8is the Rényi α-entropy. So the Rényi coherence of forma-
tion can be expressed as
CF,1/α(ρ) = min{pj ,ρ¯j}
1
1− α log
∑
j
pj2
(1−α)Sα(Mc(ρ¯j))
= min
{pj ,ρ¯j}
H↓α(A|J)Mc(∑j pj ρ¯j⊗|j〉〈j|), (C8)
where {pj, ρ¯j} satisfies ρ =
∑
j pj ρ¯j , and J denotes the
classical system of the register. The expression (C8) fol-
lows from the fact that the minimum is attained when
all ρ¯j are pure.
To prove (C4), suppose ρ1 ⊗ ρ2 has an optimal pure-
state decomposition ρ1 ⊗ ρ2 =
∑
j pj ρ¯j such that
CF,1/α(ρ1 ⊗ ρ2) =
1
1− α log
∑
j
pj2
(1−α)Cr,1/α(ρ¯j). (C9)
Let σ :=
∑
j pj ρ¯j ⊗ |j〉〈j|; then
CF,1/α(ρ1 ⊗ ρ2) = H↓α(A1A2|J)Mc,1⊗Mc,2(σ), (C10)
where Mc,1 and Mc,2 express the computational-basis
measurements on A1 and A2, respectively. Now, the
chain rule (C3) implies that
CF,1/α(ρ1 ⊗ ρ2) = H↓α(A1A2|J)Mc,1⊗Mc,2(σ)
=H↓α(A1|J)Mc,1⊗Mc,2(σ) +H↓α(A2|A1J)Mc,1⊗Mc,2(σ)
≥CF,1/α(ρ1) + CF,1/α(ρ2). (C11)
Since the opposite inequality
CF,1/α(ρ1 ⊗ ρ2) ≤ CF,1/α(ρ1) + CF,1/α(ρ2) (C12)
is an easy consequence of the definition, we deduce (C4),
assuming that the chain rule (C3) holds.
Derivation of (C5) assuming the additivity relation (C4):
When ρ is a diagonal density matrix, the paper [43,
Proposition 21] showed that
∆d,2(2
R|ρ) ≤ 3 · 2
sR−sH↑ 1
1−s
(A|E)ρ ≤ 3 · 2
sR−sH↓ 1
1−s
(A|E)ρ
(C13)
for s ∈ [0, 1/2]. Therefore,
max
ME,n
EFnd1
(
M
∗
Fn(ME,n(ρ˜
⊗n))
)
(a)
≤ 3 · 2snR−sCF,1−s(ρ˜⊗nA ) (b)= 3 · 2sn(R−CF,1−s(ρ˜A))
if s ∈ [0, 1/2] and Fn is universal 2 hash. Here (a) follows
from the combination of (A12), (C8), and (C13), while
(b) follows from the additivity of the Rényi coherence of
formation.
Appendix D: Generalization of Theorem 1
Before proving Theorem 5, which characterizes the ex-
ponential decreasing rate of the leaked information, we
need to generalize Theorem 1 in terms of Rényi condi-
tional entropies and Rényi relative entropies of coherence.
The two types of Rényi relative entropies defined in
(A6) and (A7) can be used to define two types of coher-
ence measures [27, 37],
Cr,α(ρ) := min
σ∈I
Sα(ρ‖σ), Cr,α(ρ) := min
σ∈I
Sα(ρ‖σ),
(D1)
both of which increase monotonically with α. The follow-
ing theorem generalizes Theorem 1 and thereby demon-
strates the significance of these Rényi relative entropies
of coherence.
Theorem 6.
1
n
max
Λi
H
↑
α(A|E)ρ˜⊗n[Λi] = max
Λi
H
↑
α(A|E)ρ˜[Λi]
=max
Ui
H
↑
α(A|E)ρ˜[Ui] = H
↑
α(A|E)ρ˜[UCNOT] = Cr,β(ρ˜A),
(D2)
1
n
max
Λi
H
↓
α(A|E)ρ˜⊗n[Λi] = maxΛi H
↓
α(A|E)ρ˜[Λi]
=max
Ui
H
↓
α(A|E)ρ˜[Ui] = H
↓
α(A|E)ρ˜[UCNOT] = Cr,β(ρ˜A),
(D3)
where Ui is an incoherent unitary, Λi is an incoherence-
preserving operation, (D2) holds for α, β ∈ [ 12 ,∞] with
1
α +
1
β = 2, while (D3) holds for α ∈ [ 12 ,∞] and β ∈ [0, 2]
with αβ = 1.
The proof of Theorem 6 relies on the duality relations
between Rényi conditional entropies. When ρ is a pure
state across the three systems HA,HB, and HE , these
conditional entropies obey the following duality relations
[38][40][41, Theorem 5.13][57]:
H
↑
α(A|E)ρ +H
↑
β(A|B)ρ = 0, (D4)
H
↓
α(A|E)ρ +H↑β(A|B)ρ = 0, (D5)
where (D4) holds for α, β ∈ [ 12 ,∞] with 1α + 1β = 2 and
(D5) holds for α, β ∈ [0,∞] with αβ = 1.
Proof of Theorem 6: Let β = α/(2α−1), then 1α+ 1β = 2.
Let Ui be any incoherent unitary acting onHA⊗HB; then
H
↑
α(A|E)ρ˜[Ui] = −H
↑
β(A|B)ρ˜[Ui] ≤ Er,β(ρ˜[Ui]AB)
≤ Cr,β(ρ˜[Ui]AB) ≤ Cr,β(ρ˜A). (D6)
Here the equality follows from (D4), the first inequality
follows from [27, Lemma 4], and the other two inequali-
ties are trivial. According to [27, Theorem 1], the upper
bound in the RHS of (D6) is attained when Ui is the gen-
eralized CNOT gate, in which case ρ˜[Ui]AB is maximally
correlated.
9By the same reasoning as above, we deduce the equal-
ity maxΛi H
↑
α(A|E)ρ˜[Λi] = Cr,β(ρ˜A), which in turn im-
plies that maxΛi H
↑
α(A|E)ρ˜⊗n[Λi] = Cr,β(ρ˜⊗nA ). Now the
proof of (D2) is completed by the additivity relation
Cr,β(ρ˜
⊗n
A ) = nCr,β(ρ˜A), which is shown in [27, Theo-
rem 3].
Finally, (D3) can be proved in a similar way.

Appendix E: Proof of Theorem 5
Proof of Theorem 5. Applying Proposition 2 in Ap-
pendix A, we deduce that
lim inf
n→∞
−1
n
logEFnd1
(
M
∗
Fn(ρ˜
⊗n)
)
≥ max
s∈[0,1]
1
2
(
sH
↑
1+s(A|E)Mc(ρ˜) − sR
)
. (E1)
Now Theorem 5 is a corollary of the following equation
H
↑
1+s(A|E)Mc(ρ˜) = H
↑
1+s(A|E)ρ˜[UCNOT] = Cr, 1+s1+2s (ρ˜A),
(E2)
where the second equality follows from (D2) in Theo-
rem 6.
Appendix F: Security analysis based on an
alternative criterion
Here we analyze the exponential decreasing rate of the
alternative security measure I ′(ρAE) defined in (A20),
which denotes the relative entropy between the true state
and the ideal state [42]. Similar to Theorem 5, we have
lim inf
n→∞
−1
n
logEFnI
′(
M
∗
Fn(ρ˜
⊗n)
)
≥ max
s∈[0,1]
(
sCr, 11+s (ρ˜A)− sR
)
. (F1)
Again, the exponential decreasing rate of the leaked in-
formation is controlled by Rényi relative entropies of co-
herence. To prove (F1), note that
lim inf
n→∞
−1
n
logEFnI
′(
M
∗
Fn(ρ˜
⊗n)
)
≥ max
s∈[0,1]
(
sH
↓
1+s(A|E)Mc(ρ˜) − sR
)
(F2)
according to Proposition 4 in Appendix A. Now (F1) is
a corollary of the following equation
H
↓
1+s(A|E)Mc(ρ˜) = H
↓
1+s(A|E)ρ˜[UCNOT] = Cr, 11+s (ρ˜A),
(F3)
where the second equality follows from (D3) in Theo-
rem 6.
Appendix G: Proof of Corollary 1
In view of Theorems 2 and 3, Corollary 1 is an imme-
diate consequence of the following lemma.
Lemma 1. A qubit state ρ saturates the inequality
CF(ρ) ≥ Cr(ρ) iff ρ is pure or incoherent.
Proof. The inequality CF ≥ Cr holds in general because
CF is the convex roof of Cr.
Any qubit state can be written as follows,
ρ =
1
2
(I + xσx + yσy + zσz), x
2 + y2 + z2 ≤ 1. (G1)
Let r =
√
x2 + y2 + z2, then
Cr(ρ) = H
(1 + z
2
)
−H
(1 + r
2
)
, (G2)
CF(ρ) = H
(1 +√1− x2 − y2
2
)
, (G3)
whereH(p) = −p log p−(1−p) log(1−p), and the formula
for CF(ρ) was derived in Ref. [24]. The relation between
Cr and CF was illustrated in Fig. 3 of [25].
If ρ is pure, then x2 + y2 + z2 = 1, so that CF(ρ) =
Cr(ρ) = H
(
1+z
2
)
. If ρ is incoherent, then x = y = 0, so
that CF = Cr = 0.
To determine the condition for saturating the inequal-
ity CF ≥ Cr, first consider the case y = z = 0, so that
Cr(ρ) = 1−H
(
1+x
2
)
and CF(ρ) = H
(
1+
√
1−x2
2
)
. By com-
puting the first and second derivatives of CF(ρ) − Cr(ρ)
with x, it is not difficult to prove that CF(ρ) = Cr(ρ) iff
x = 0 or x = ±1.
Next, consider the case 0 < x < 1, y = 0, z ≥ 0,
and x2 + z2 < 1. Let ρ1, ρ2 be two qubit states with
Bloch vectors (x, 0, 0) and (x, 0,
√
1− x2), respectively.
Then ρ is a convex combination of ρ1 and ρ2, that is,
ρ = p1ρ1 + p2ρ2 with p1 > 0. In addition,
CF(ρ) = CF(ρ1) = CF(ρ2) = Cr(ρ2), CF(ρ1) > Cr(ρ1).
(G4)
Given that Cr is convex, we conclude that
Cr(ρ) ≤ p1Cr(ρ1) + p2Cr(ρ2) < p1CF(ρ1) + p2CF(ρ2)
= CF(ρ). (G5)
By symmetry Cr(ρ) < CF(ρ) whenever x
2+y2+z2 < 1
and x2+y2 > 0. Therefore, the inequality CF(ρ) ≥ Cr(ρ)
is saturated iff the qubit state ρ is pure or incoherent.
Appendix H: Application to quantum random
number generators
In this appendix, we explain the application of our
study to the design of a quantum random number genera-
tor. Remember that our optimal incoherent strategy can
be realized by the measurement Mc in the computational
10
basis followed by classical data processing. A quantum
random number generator consists of the following in-
gredients: an internal quantum system, the device that
performs the computational-basis measurement, and the
data processor that extracts secure uniform random num-
bers. To make a quantum random number generator as
an industrial product, the supplier needs to specify the
method for preparing the state of the internal system,
which can be identified by quantum state tomography
[44–46][41, Chapter 6].
To implement quantum state tomography, the supplier
can apply suitable measurements to the quantum system
and reconstruct the quantum state based on the mea-
surement statistics. Since quantum measurements are
destructive, to achieve sufficient precision in this proce-
dure, usually many identically-prepared quantum states
are needed to gather enough information. In addition,
quantum state tomography may require operations that
are not incoherent, but this is not a problem. Note that
in the design stage of the random number generator, it is
reasonable to assume that the supplier can access certain
advanced equipments and are not restricted to incoherent
operations, in contrast with the user stage of the device.
Once the internal state ρ˜A of the random number gen-
erator is determined, the supplier can choose the pa-
rameter n and the extraction rate R based on the up-
per bound determined by (A12) and (A13), so that the
amount of leaked information d1(M
∗
Fn
|Fn) is less than a
given threshold. Note that the combination of (A12) and
(A13) allows to perform a finite-length analysis. Since
d1(M
∗
Fn
|Fn) decreases exponentially with n, this task can
be achieved with a suitable choice of the parameters as
long as ρ˜A is sufficiently coherent. In addition, the sup-
plier needs to design universal 2 hash functions so as to
perform randomness extraction. Although random num-
bers are needed to apply random hash functions, the se-
curity is not compromised even if Eve knows which spe-
cific hash function is applied each time. Therefore, the
supplier needs to design universal 2 hash functions only
once, which can then be reused repeatedly. The user
does not have to invest random numbers to operate the
random number generator.
So far we have assumed that the measurement device
for estimating the quantum state of the internal system is
trustworthy. This assumption is not absolutely necessary.
Even when the measurement device cannot be trusted,
the supplier can identify the measurement device by ap-
plying the method of self testing [47–49]. The self testing
was originally proposed using the CHSH test, which re-
quires the preparation of a Bell state [47, 48]. Recently,
the paper [49] improved it by proposing a hybrid method
of the CHSH test and the Bell state test, i.e., the sta-
bilizer test. Applying this method before quantum state
tomography, the supplier can identify the measurement
device so that the quantum state of the internal system
can be guaranteed. Similarly, the measurement device
for generating random numbers may not be trustworthy.
In that case, the supplier can apply the self testing to
this measurement device. In this way, the supplier can
guarantee the security of the random numbers generated
by the random number generator.
Appendix I: Relation with [24]
Here, we need to discuss the relation with the pa-
per [24], which studied a related but different problem.
The focus of the current paper is the extraction of uni-
form random numbers by incoherent strategies, which in-
clude the measurement on the computational basis and
general incoherent operations (or incoherence-preserving
operations). The focus of [24] is the connection between
intrinsic randomness and coherence measures. In in-
formation theory, the term “intrinsic randomness” usu-
ally means the extraction of uniform random numbers
[58, 59]. In [24], the term has a related but different
meaning, that is, the randomness of measurement out-
comes conditioned on Eve’s prediction. With this latter
interpretation, [24] showed that the intrinsic randomness
of measurement outcomes with respect to the computa-
tional basis is equal to the coherence of formation, with-
out discussing general protocols for extracting uniform
random numbers.
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